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The Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1963 was 
the culmination of decades of effort to achieve equity in 
the porvision of mental health care by developing a 
comprehensive and coordinated network of service 
within the community. The statute projected the mental 
health profession beyond the confines of the clincial 
establishment into the fabric of community life. The 
challenge given the new mental health centers was to aid 
people, " ... too fearful, too angry, too alienated, too 
hopeless to seek any kind to help." 1 
The community mental health movement is hardly 
"revolutionary' . What it has really offered is an 
extension of mental health services to those who had 
previously been denied them, without any clear transfer 
of control over the provision of those services to the 
comm uni ties involved. It is true that the 1963 Act 
defineq responsibility in terms of the health needs of a 
population rather than the illness needs of individuals; it 
stressed prevention as well as treatment; and it · 
structured programs within geo-political boundaries. By 
insisting upon the inclusion of citizen groups in the 
planning process (although only at the state level}, the 
Act focused mental health services on local communities 
in a dramatic and innovative manner. Yet as the mental 
health profession struggled to maintain a sense of 
identity and purpose within this new context, what had 
been viewed as a progressive movement toward 
accessible treatment, rehabilitative and preventive service 
was frequently perceived by consumers as but another 
palliative. As a result, what the architects of the 
community mental health movement heralded as 
"mental health's third revolution" was to be used by 
militant mental health professionals and their commu-
nity allies as a vehicle for revolt against the mental 
health establishment itself. 
The focal issue was community participation. By the 
mid-l 960's good will was no longer enough. Many 
consumers, deeply suspicious of the establishment's 
willingness to change itself, demanded a redistribution of 
decision making power. Some professionals agreed. 
The reasons for which professionals endorse the goal of 
community participation, we will set out shortly. What 
must be emphasized first, by way of introduction, is the 
lack of preparation or guidance which the mental health 
establishment itself brought to the often confusing 
problems created by an operational emphasis on 
community participation programs. Neither the 
movement's activist professionals nor the institutions 
tacitily supporting the thrust into the community nor 
even the language and legislative history of the original 
1963 statute were able to guide the evolution of 
participatory models. 
Professionals discovered that effective and representative 
community participation may suffer when a participa-
tory group takes a stand on a politically controversial 
social issue. Universities and state and federal govern-
ments, rather than setting guidelines for participatory 
programs, have adopted, in effect, a policy of benign 
neglect toward community involvement. They have 
tended to underplay the fundamental divergence 
between their own political and social views and those of 
community groups participating in the delivery of 
mental health services. The 1963 Community Mental 
Health Centers Act fails to specify what role, if any, 
local community participation is to play in controlling 
the provision of services, indicating only that the centers 
should focus on providing comprehensive services that 
meet the needs of their particular communities. What 
was on the legislators' minds was a shift in responsibility 
for the provision of mental health care from the states to 
the localities, a shift which would be initially aided by 
federal funding. Radically improving the preventive and 
outpatient care available in communities would reduce 
the burden on state-supported facilities for the long-term 
hospitalization of the mentally ill. 2 
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The rationale for including participation as a core 
element in a program of mental health service to 
community is threefold: empirical, sociological and 
psychological. A considerable body of current data 
indicates that mental health services are not only 
organized inefficiently and distributed inequitably, but 
that the inter-relations between various agencies are 
characterized more by insularity and rivalry than by 
collaboration.3 These empirical realities seem related to 
the prerogatives and roles historically assigned by society 
to the clinician-healer. Surrounded by the aura of 
omniscience with which societies so frequently endow 
their healers and bulwarked by a "special competence" 
gained through professional training and validated by 
licensure, the healer is cast as a beneficent authority. His 
authority is often use.d to justify his drawing of the 
boundaries of the mental health domain; hence it 
becomes possible to limit psycho-social problem solving 
to areas which the mental health professional himself 
deems of primary import. The resultant institutional 
self-definition can and has led to the emergence of major 
service gaps which discriminate against the more 
disadvantaged sectors of the population, for instance, in 
the consignment to state mental hospitals of certain 
types of chronic psychotic patients. The empiricist 
argues that the sharing of responsibility and authority 
with community would build a set of checks and 
balances into the mental health delivery system which 
would militate against the emergence of major service 
gaps, while simultaneously placing the citizen-participant 
in a stronger position to insist upon inter-agency 
collaboration. 
The sociological justification for participation is derived 
from a Mills-ian concern over the transformation of 
America into a society where individuals lose any 
effective means of criticizing or influencing the world in 
which they live.4 As impersonal and automatic 
mechanisms of control and coordination supplant visible 
and personal authority and leadership, human responsi-
bility and freedom are reduced and society's institutions 
are increasingly dehumanized. Participation is seen as a 
vehicle for mitigating the anonymity of man by giving 
him a modicum of control over his immediate life-space. 
"If one cause of disruption in our society is alienation from 
the immediacy of life on many levels-in education, in 
employment, in sensuality, in responsibility for political 
decision-making-then participation is certainly the first step 
towards cure." 5 
The psychological rational for participation stems from 
data indicating that the incidence of severe emotional 
disorder and social pathology is highly correlated with 
socio-demographic variables frequently referred to as the 
handmaidens of poverty-unemployment, family 
disorganization, under-education, poor housing and 
social disequilibriu, to name but a few. 6 While the data 
are not so conclusive as to demonstrate a causal 
relationship between poverty and mental illness, various 
psychological mechanisms have been posited as 
intervening variables that help explain the observations. 
Of these, powerlessness and lowered self-esteem have 
received the greatest attention. W. Ryan formulates this 
rationale: 
' to a significant extent and in a significant number of cases, 
emotional disorder is based on lowered self-esteem. Self-
esteem is largely dependent upon the exercise of a minimum 
quantity of power in relation to one's environment, as well as 
a perception of oneself as a minimally powerful person. 
Powerlessness is a major characteristic of low income 
neighborhoods and of the residents of these neighborhoods, 
which in turn leads to significantly higher levels of emotional 
disorder and other forms of social pathology. A program of 
mental health enhancement and emotional disorder preven-
tion, therefore, can meaningfully address itself to the issue of 
personal and community power." 7 
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Now let us examine the vicissitudes in both community 
and institutional relations encountered by one mental 
health facility, the Hill-West Haven Division in New 
Haven, as it attempted to realize both this goal of 
community participation and the service mandate 
dictated by the 1963 legislation. The dilemmas 
encountered, the issues raised, have been paralleled in 
Model Cities programs, Legal Aid offices, and "commu-
nity" schools across the nation. 
The Hill-West Haven Division is an integral part of the 
Connecticut Mental Health Center. A collaborative 
effort of the State of Connecticut and Yale University, 
the Center was organized in a unit system in order to 
facilitate the testing out of divergent models of care. The 
Hill-West Haven Division, the sole portion of the 
institution which is a federally funded Mental Health 
Center under the 1963 legislation, was one of its original 
units. The Division's service area covers the Hill · 
neighborhood of New Haven, population 25,000, and 
the City of West Haven, population 50,000. West Haven 
is a predominantly white, lower middle-class working 
town that is heavily dependent upon New Haven-based 
agencies for social and health care services. The Hill, the 
last major inner city area in New Haven to undergo 
urban redevelopment, is currently in the throes of 
marked social transition. Poor income, unemployment, 
low educational level, substandard housing and 
overcrowding characterize the neighborhood. 
From its inception in 1966, the staff of the Division saw 
itself as implementing a particular model of service to 
the communtiy. This model holds that such service 
represents a working alliance between citizens and staff 
to seek out and modify vectors harmful to mental health 
through social action, consultation, education and 
research; to support individuals in their efforts at dealing 
with life stresses, whether they be internal or external 
through the provision of a full complement of clinical 
services which assure ease of access and continuity of 
care to catchment residents; and, to develop an effective 
community mental health manpower base through 
training program for neighborhood residents. The model 
thus necessarily includes participation and social action 
as well as emergency and outpatient treatment, 
twenty-four hour and partial hospitalization, rehabilita-
tion and resocialization, child care, consultation, 
education, research and training. 
Nonetheless, citizen involvement with the Hill-West 
Haven Division was initially informal and unstructured. 
Counsel was sought from community members and 
numerous grass root groups around program goals and 
priorities; however, neither the authority of community 
in relation to Division, nor the accountability of the 
Division and its staff to community were made explicit. 
This was, in large part, due to the nature of the 
catchment. There were no neighborhood mechanisms for 
either coordinating or regulating social or health care 
services. Thus in concert with various community groups 
and other agencies, the Division staffs initial energy was 
devoted to community development. The goal was the 
evolution of mechanisms to assure maximal participation 
of consumers and potential consumers in all aspects of 
health planning and programming and a facilitate the 
emergence of an integrated health and social service 
delivery system. 
In the Hill, the first effort involved bringing together 
representatives of essentially every public and private 
agency, church and civic group serving the community. 
The body that evolved (The Hill Inter-agency Council), 
in concert with an elected coordinating unit, partici-
pated in the formation of another citizen group, the Hill 
Health Committee, which served as a forum for dealing 
with issue-oriented problems related to health and health 
services and as an adviser to various health and mental 
health agencies in the community.8 
In West Haven, the Division's staff participated with 
other agencies in the formation of a Community Services 
Committee, to develop comprehensive plans not only for 
mental health services but for all human services in the 
community. The committee's membership was drawn 
primarily from community welfare and health agencies, 
civic and religious organizations, public and parochial 
schools, the Chamber of Commerce, the Police 
Department and representatives of major employers. 
By the spring of 1969, then, these organized structures 
designated as the Community Boards for the Hill-West 
· Haven Division, existed in both communities. These 
Boards had clearly defined responsibilities in the area of 
program development, personnel practices, and the 
establishment of service and research priorities. 
In this process of developing an alliance with the 
consumer, the Division's relations with the community 
occasionally became strained. The enthusiasm and 
optimism that characterized the Kennedy era and the 
social programs instituted at that time was shared by the 
staff of The Hill-West Haven division. They were 
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committed to the Division's preventive and curative 
mission, particularly the social action and consumer 
participatory elements. Conflict between these elements 
of their program seemed unlikely-but it has occurred. 
For instance, in the fall of 1967, the Division was asked 
to conduct a series of seminars on sex education by a 
racially mixed neighborhood group consisting of parents 
of children attending the one predominantly black 
public school in the city of West Haven. Growing 
anxiety over inter-racial sexuality was the latent reason 
for the request. Considerable effort went into the 
program, which was considered helpful. Two years later, 
the Division was again asked to present the series. By 
this time, however, the city's de facto segregation had 
become a public issue. The parents' group with whom 
the Division was working consisted of several leaders 
pressing for an integrated school system. As articles on 
racial imbalance appeared in the press and a racial fight 
occurred at one of the city schools, staff members were 
requested by the parents' group to speak out on the 
deleterious effects of de facto school segregation. Several 
did. 
At the same time, the issue was presented to the 
Division's West Haven participatory group, the West 
Haven Consumer Board. After considerable debate, and 
partly as a result of staff lobbying, the Board took a 
position in favor of integrating the local schools. Before 
"Conservative critics 
accused staff members of 
being 'Ivy League puppets'" 
that position became public, however, the President of 
the Board resigned, and others opposing school 
integration followed suit. In the ensuing political fracas, 
attacks were received from both ends of the political 
spectrum. Conservative critics accused staff members of 
being "Ivy League puppets" and "ruffling the calm 
waters of the community,' while from the other end 
Consumer Board members were accused of being "hard 
Hats" and of '·whitewashing" the real problems of the 
city. Association with the group came to be considered 
"radical" by a small but vocal segment of the commu-
nity. The base of support which the board itself could 
generate was diminished, and some staff were reluctant 
to view the Board as ' really representing the commu-
nity." 
This episode suggests a paradox that the "hip profession-
al" 9 has difficulty in facing: What if community 
participation or consumer control bodies lose their 
representative legitimacy in the political controversy 
resulting from the professionals' advocacy of social 
change? What obligations exist not to work for social 
change, to hide may place in jeopardy the benefits of 
community participation in structuring therapeutic 
programs. There is a marked tendency to avoid the 
painful reality that, at times, social change and 
community participation will not be synonymous. 
Another pitfall awaits the unwary professional; the 
well-meant oversell. In taking its preventive and curative 
mission to the Hill neighborhood, the Division staff, a 
cadre of less than fifty people, was presented as being 
able to contribute meaningfully to virtually every aspect 
of community life. Despite the exuberance and 
tirelessness of staff members, however, the promises 
could not be met. While understandable in retrospect, 
the failure created a "credibility gap" that subsequently 
gave the community cause to question both the intent 
and ability of the Division to "deliver". Now, in almost 
every major interchange between community and the 
Division-discussing a proposed grant, altering the 
staffing pattern of a component, instituting a new 
training program for catchment residents-a neighbor-
hood person rises up and recalls the unfulfilled promises 
and dashed hopes of the past. The professional reduces 
his usefulness as much by exaggerating his ability to 
produce change as by refusing to recognize the need for 
change. 
Experience with both professional social activism and 
the professional oversell give rise to the suspicion in both 
blue-collar white and ghetto black communities that 
community participation, today's royal road to 
romance, is really just an updated primrose path. That 
suspicion is reasonable. The opportunity to participate 
and the act of participation are merely preconditions for 
the acquisition of power. Power itself is another matter. 
In reality, consumers and a community-oriented staff 
must either wrest power and authority from their 
supporting institutions or acquire them through the 
legitimizing function of those same supporting 
institutions. The political impact of the community 
participation ideology cannot be fully assessed without 
looking to the role of those supporting institutions. 
As noted previously, the supporting institutions of the 
Hill-West Haven Division include the Federal govern-
ment, the State of Connecticut, and Yale University. A 
lengthy Memorandum of Agreement, apportions 
responsibility and authority between Medical School 
Dean and Mental Health Commissioner. Both Commis-
sioner and Dean are free to delegate their authority to 
the Director of the Connecticut Mental Health Center. 
They are also free to revoke that authority at any time. 
The Division, despite its federal funding under the 1963 
Statute as an integral part of the Connecticut Mental 
Health Center, officially exists, as it were, at the 
sufferance of these two institutions. 
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today's royal road to romance, 
is really just an updated 
primrose path." 
Aware of the staffs zeal and ideological commitment, 
fully apprised of the program's social as well as clinical 
go~s, and kno:-vledgeable about the steps contemplated 
for 1mplementmg these goals, the state and university 
have tolerated the Division's activities, while clearly not 
ascribing to its philosophy. Almost from the inception 
of the Division, that tolerance has been severely tested. 
During the 1967 "summer disturbances" which occurred 
in the Hill neighborhood, for instance, the Division was 
us~d both as a refuge for burned-out and frightened 
neighborhood people and as a meeting place for 
community groups attempting to be helpful to residents. 
~s fear of further trouble grew, community representa-
tives approached Division staff members and asked that 
they arrange for residents, particularly frightened 
mothers and children, to be .bussed out of the area. The 
staff agreed to the request, contacted the local bus 
company and negotiated the donation of two buses to 
help evacuate people into the suburbs. This act was not 
well received by local government officials who charged 
the staff with spreading terror in the community. While 
~his. w~ going on, ironically, another part of the parent 
mstitution, an area in the Connecticut Mental Health 
Center, was being used for a short time as a communica-
tion center and staging area for state police-a symbolic 
testimony to the schism within. In the aftermath of the 
"disturbances," the existence of the schism was made 
quite explicit. The stance of the Division was labeled too 
partisan, too involved, and far beyond the limits of the 
staffs professional competence. 
Despite the resulting friction in their relations with the 
Division, and numerous subsequent incidents exacer-
?ati~g ~hat friction, neither of the two local sponsoring 
msbtutions has developed clear guidelines around the 
issues of participation and social action, an omission 
shared by the Division's third sponsor, the federal 
government. For instance, while the National Institute 
of Mental Health, the funding channel for the centers, 
has consistently encouraged citizen involvement in 
community mental health centers, the regulations issued 
by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under 
the 1963 statute are ambiguous as to the nature and 
level of that involvement. 10 One might contend that 
such ambiguity is politic, since the political liabilities of 
community participation are more likely to be felt at the 
local rather than the federal level. 11 
The University has similarly failed to define clear 
guidelines regarding social action or participation for the 
community programs with which it is involved. President 
Brewster, of Yale, has spoken to the issue of the 
constraints upon a private university's assumption of a 
major role in community: 
"No matter how useful it is for the training of students or for 
the problem it offers for study and research, the management 
of a community service activity involves obligations which are 
at least different from, and may on occasion be adverse to the 
interests of the academy; ' 
"I.n the case of private universities at least, there is a basic 
misfit between community needs and the sources of our 
pr~nciple suppo~t. ... Political pressure from the ghetto 
neighborhoods m New Haven upon my institution however is 
likely to fail on politically deaf ears in Hartford w'hich is n;t 
in the habi.t of supporting Yale. The same neighborhood 
pressure will also fall on financially deaf ears among my 
out-of-town alumni, who are not in the habit of supporting 
New Haven ... 
" .... society, too, will be better served if we continue to limit 
o~r proprietary responsibility to our principal task of 
discovery, conservation and transmission of knowledge." 
In the absence of a clearly defined institutional position 
~eg~rdi~g community participation, the sponsoring 
institutions have adopted a policy of benign neglect: 
government and university have never formally 
acknowledged the existence or prerogatives of the 
Division's community boards; yet neither have they 
repudiated them. Does this reflect an awareness of the 
contradictions of their role in publically supporting an 
institution promoting social change which leads to a 
diminution in their own authority? Several explanations 
of the pattern of benign neglect suggest themselves: 
turmoil and expedience; pragmatism and the hedged bet. 
The health care system in our nation, and the university 
medical centers that intermesh with it, are not only in a 
precarious fiscal situation as a result of financial 
cutbacks, but they are also racked by internal conflict 
and are in the process of fundamental change. Under 
such circumstances, it is altogether possible that our 
particular federal-state-university minotaur views the 
activities of a small segment such as the Hill-West Haven 
Division as vexatious, but inconsequential-a gadfly not 
worthy of attention. 
Another possible reason for a policy of benign neglect 
by state and university is expediency. It is one thing to 
rap the hand that feeds you, but quite another to cut it 
off. For many years universities as well as state and local 
governments have complained about the cost and 
conditions of federal support. But they have not refused 
it. While it is true that Federal support for the establish-
ment of community mental health centers can be viewed 
as an attempt to get long-run program development with 
short-run funding, we can calculate that the state of 
Connecticut receives considerable federal funding during 
the eight-year period that the Hill-West Haven Division's 
grants are in effect. The declining nature of these federal 
funds means that provision must ultimately be made for 
state support. Nonetheless, the federal monies allow the 
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development and expansion of human setvices at 
minimal initial cost at a time of fiscal crises and in a 
manner that enables state and local planners to schedule 
their expenditures along a predictable time table. For 
the university, such government funding, while not the 
sauce bordelaise which they prefer, is still gravy; 
furthermore, a university medical school, to support its 
primary missions of research and training, requires room 
for expansion and diversification and can ill afford to 
estrange itself from a community to which it contri-
butes, within which it exists and upon which it is 
dependent. 
A further possibility is that entities like the Division, 
with its apparatus of community control, its community 
selected staff, indigenous paraprofessionals and social 
action commitment, are no more than tethered bears 
that setve to keep the community ·'cool" and the 
supporting institutions "relevant". Indeed, some see 
"community medicine" as a sop to divert attention so 
that medical institutions can carry out their self-defined 
missions in relative peace. 
Another view is more positive-Brandeisian slmost-and 
ascribes the benign neglect to a societal pragmatism, an 
institutional hedged bet. It holds that when society is in 
transition; when old solutions appear inadequate, 
decentralization permits experiments aimed at new 
solutions. Over time, those solutions that work become 
more widely adopted; others are eliminated. Thus, 
institutions sutvive. Governments and universities, with a 
stake in suivival, permit experimentation as a part of this 
process. 
Participatory models are being tried in areas other than 
mental health, and frequently with parentage as unlikely 
as that of Yale and the State of Connecticut. It may be 
that the devient child will produce an exceptional 
offspring. It may be that if we are going to offer mental 
health setvice to the poor, only an alliance with them 
will produce the preventive, clinical and rehabilitative 
setvice envisioned in the 1963 law. 
The Hill-West Haven Division felt that to accomplish this 
statutory aim successfully, the community had to be 
brought into the mental health system as more than the 
recipients of bountiful clinical largesse. Implicit was a 
transfer of power and authority from entrenched 
institutions to new structural forms rooted in the life of 
the community. Such a transfer is radical in a "demo-
cratic egalitarian society" only insofar as it dares suggest 
that authority ought to be shared by the seivant with 
the setved. 
What the community mental health movement has 
frequently labeled a "revolution," appears to be 
revisionism or, at best, reformation. 
If the societal pragmatists are right and continue to 
advocate benign neglect, participatory models such as 
ours should, allowed sufficient time, lead to'structural 
forms where power is shared between established 
institutions and communities. This benign neglect, 
whatever the motivation, will not undermine, as open 
criticism would, the legitimacy which the supporting 
institutions bring to community organizations. These 
forms, when stabilized, will permit a new allocation of 
resources leading to a more resilient and responsive 
"In the absence of a clearly defined ... position regarding 
community participation, the sponsoring institutions have 
adopted a policy of benign neglect." 
mental health care system. If the pragmatists are wrong, 
if they are overruled, or if community-based institutions 
are in fact being exploited as "cooling off' mechanisms, 
still these structural forms may nonetheless, be 
transformed into political base camps from which even 
more massive assaults upon entrenched institutions can 
be launched. 
Perhaps my son, the doctor, is not in fact drowning. He 
may just be out there learning to swim. 
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1. Brickman, H. (1967). Community Mental 
Health-The Metropolitan View. American 
Journal of Public Health: 57: 649. 
2. House Report No 694, of the Subcommittee 
on Public Health and Safety of the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, saw the central issue addressed by the 
Community Mental Health Centers Act of 
1963, and the solution it offered in these 
terms: 
"The evidence seems clear. Either we must 
develop the quantity and quality of 
community services which will ultimately 
replace these [State) institutions or we shall 
have to undertake a massive program to 
strengthen the State Mental hospitals ... " 
"It is planned that the community mental 
health centers will transfer the care of the 
mentally ill from State custodial institutions 
to community facilities and services 
comparable to the facilities and services 
provided at the community level for those 
who are physically ill." 
H. R. Rep. No. 694, 88th Cong. lst Sess. 1963 
(U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative 
News, 1054, at 1065 and 1058). 
There was conscious recognition that the 
delivery of mental health services on the 
community level required a program responsive 
to specific community needs. President 
Kennedy's message to Congress concerning the 
1963 Act made this plan: 
"Central to a new mental health program is 
comprehensive community care ... Located 
in the patients' own environment and 
community, the center will make possible a 
better understanding of his needs, a more 
cordial atmosphere for his recovery, and a 
continuation of treatment Mental Illness and 
Mental Retardation, Message from the 
President of the United States. House 
Document No. 58, 88th Cong. lst Sess. 109 
Cong. Rec. Part 2, 1837, at 1839 (1963). 
This community focus takes the form in the 
Act itself of one of the criteria for approval by 
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 
of application for federal financing of 
community mental health constructive 
projects: 
"that the services to be provided by the 
center, alone or in conjunction with other 
facilities owned or operated by the applicant 
or affiliated or associated with the applicant, 
will be part of a program providing, 
principally for persons residing in a 
particular community or communities in or 
near which such center is to be situated, at 
least those essential elements of comprehen-
sive mental health services for mentally ill 
persons which are prescribed by the 
Secretary in accordance with regulations ... 
Pub. L. No. 88-164, Title II,§ 205 (I) Oct. 31, 
1963, 77 Stat. 292, now 42 U.S. C. 2685 (a). 
The House Report suggested that community 
participation would be the process used for 
ascertaining community needs: 
"Each community would have a major voice 
in determining the basic pattern of services 
to be off erred through its own mental health 
center." H.R. Rep. No. 694, 88th Cong. lst 
session 1963 (U. S. Code Congressional.and 
Administrative News, 1054, at 1066") 
But the Act itself nowhere refers to a process of 
local community participation. ·Neither the 
1965 Mental Health Amendments, providing 
for staffing grants, nor the 1967 Mental Health 
Amendments gave any more guidance. 
The Regulations issued by the Secretary of 
HEW in 1964, pursuant to § 205 of the Act 
stipulated five essential elements of comprehen-
sive mental health services. 
(1) Inpatient Services. 
(2) Outpatient Services. 
(3) Partial hospitalization services-must 
include at least day care service. 
(4) Emergency services provided 24 hours 
per day must be available within at least one 
of the first three services listed above. 
(5) Consultation and education services 
available to community agencies and 
professional personnel. (42 CFR 
§54.212 (1)). 
These minimum service standards were 
determined in Washington. The Regulations did 
not set out anywhere any mechanism for 
supplementing them with standards derived 
from community assessments of their specific, 
local needs. 
3. See, for example: Duff, R.S. and Hollings-
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